Daily Archives: September 11, 2012

Foreclosure Fail: Study Pins Blame on Big Banks

Foreclosure Fail: Study Pins Blame on Big Banks

A study by government and academic researchers finds that approximately 800,000 homeowners missed out on mortgage modifications because of big banks’ poor performance.

Foreclosure Crisis Opens and Closes a Treasure Trove of Parks

Atlanta has struggled through the great recession with one of the biggest foreclosure epidemics in the U.S. At its peak, in 2010, there were more than 127,000 foreclosures in the Atlanta metro area. The latest count tallied more than 72,000. Statewide, Georgia has the fourth highest rate of foreclosure in the U.S., according to July figures from RealtyTrac. Empty houses are all over the place. For almost everyone concerned, this is a problem. But for others, the swath of foreclosed homes present an opportunity.

“A lot of us in the beginning had thought ‘Ooh, there’s a silver lining to this cloud,'” says Ellen Wickersham. She’s in charge of parkland acquisition for Invest Atlanta, the city’s economic development agency. She and others in her field had assumed that all these empty homes with no owners in sight and prices near the floor were prime park-making ingredients.

Read on.

HSH NORDBANK AG vs BARCLAYS | 99% of mortgages in each of 3 Securitizations were improperly or never assigned

Via Livinglies:

Salient Quotes from Complaint

1. This action arises out of Defendants’ conduct in connection with the offer and sale to Plaintiffs of certain residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”). Plaintiffs purchased approximately $46 million in RMBS certificates (the “Certificates”) in connection with three securitizations issued and/or underwritten by Defendants. These three securitizations are commonly known by their abbreviated names, SABR 2005-FR4, SABR 2006-FR1 and SABR 2007-NC2 (collectively, the “Securitizations”). Plaintiffs’ holdings in the Securitizations, including purchase dates and amounts invested, are detailed in Table 1, infra Section I.

3. Through investigation of a large sample of publicly recorded mortgage documents, Plaintiffs have discovered that more than 99% of the mortgages in each of the three Securitizations were improperly or never assigned. In particular, many of these mortgages remain in the name of the loan’s originator or its nominee, and have never been assigned to the Trusts. While others were purportedly assigned to the Trusts, this was long after the securities were issued, contrary to the representations in the Offering Documents. Similarly, the promissory notes were not properly assigned in approximately 81.9% of the sampled loans.

9. By reviewing a large sample of loans in the Securitizations and comparing the representations made about them in the Offering Documents to publicly available data concerning those same loans, Plaintiffs have discovered that the Offering Documents understated CLTV by more than 10 percent in approximately 37% of the loans, based on the sampled loans.

Plaintiffs’ investigation has also revealed that the Offering Documents overstated owner occupancy rates by approximately 14.3% – 19.2%, based on the sampled loans.



Via Matt Weidner:

This is an action for damages caused by violation of the Texas Securities Act
(TSA) and the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) by the defendants. As alleged in detail below, defendants issued, underwrote, or sold eight securities known as “certificates,” which were backed by collateral pools of residential mortgage loans. Guaranty Bank (Guaranty) paid approximately $1.5 billion for the eight certificates. When they issued, underwrote, or sold the certificates, the defendants made numerous statements of material fact about the certificates and, in particular, about the credit quality of the mortgage loans that backed them. Many of those statements were untrue. Moreover, the defendants omitted to state many material facts that were necessary in order to make their statements not misleading. For example, the defendants made
untrue statements or omitted important information about such material facts as the loan-to-value ratios of the mortgage loans, the extent to which appraisals of the properties that secured the loans were performed in compliance with professional appraisal standards, the number of borrowers who did not live in the houses that secured their loans (that is, the number of properties that were not primary residences), and the extent to which the entities that made the
loans disregarded their own standards in doing so.