JP Morgan Chase Bank NA corporate registration info at SEC as Municipal Advisor

And what is a Municipal Advisor?:

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 expanded the MSRB’s jurisdiction to include the regulation of municipal advisors.

The Dodd-Frank Act requires all municipal advisors, broadly defined as including financial advisors, guaranteed investment contract brokers, third-party marketers, placement agents, solicitors finders and certain swap advisors that provide municipal advisory services, to be registered both with the MSRB and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). A list of MSRB-registered municipal advisors is available here.

The SEC has a temporary registration rule in place until September 30, 2013 for municipal advisors as it finalizes its interpretation of who qualifies as a “municipal advisor” under Dodd-Frank.

Someone found this SEC registration of a  Municipal Advisor Temporary form filled by a JP Morgan representative. Click here.

Highlights of JPMorgan Chase e-mails

Highlights of JPMorgan Chase e-mails

Highlights of e-mails, phone transcripts and other internal bank information from a Senate investigation of JPMorgan Chase’s disastrous “London Whale” derivatives trading that lost the nation’s largest bank at least $6.2 billion:

“I am going to be hauled over the coals. … [Y]ou don’t lose 500 M[illion] without consequences.”

— March 23, 2012, instant message from London-based bank trader Bruno Iksil after a day of heavy trading losses.

“I can’t hold on anymore to this thing.” … “I don’t know where he wants to stop …but it’s becoming idiotic … [N]ow it’s worse than before … there’s nothing that can be done, absolutely nothing that can be done, there’s no hope … The
book continues to grow, more and more monstrous.”

— Transcript of March 16, 2012, phone conversation in which Iksil spoke to bank colleague Julien Grout about the growing size of the disastrous strategy.

“[T]he only one I see is to stay as we are and let the book simply die ….”

— January 30, 2012, e-mail from iksil to seeking guidance from supervisor Javier Martin-Artajo about continuing losses and poor liquidity in the credit market.

“Ina is freaking – really! Call me.”

— March 22, 2012, e-mail from Irvin Goldman to fellow bank risk manager Peter Weiland, referring to then-Chief Investment Officer Ina Drew’s concern over the growing size of the risky trading positions.

A “make believe voodoo magic ‘composite hedge.'”

— May 18, 2012, e-mail in which Elwyn Wong, an Office of the Comptroller of the Currency examiner, expressed skepticism about the bank’s claim that the trading strategy was a hedge against risk.

Levin Committee report makes fraud case for JPMorgan shareholders

Levin Committee report makes fraud case for JPMorgan shareholders

 

On Tuesday, shareholder lawyers leading the 10-month-old securities fraud class action accusing JPMorgan Chase of deceiving investors about billions of dollars in losses by the bank’s chief investment office received permission to delay filing their latest complaint until April 12, in order to allow them time to digest the findings of a Senate investigation of the bank’s so-called “whale trades.” That was good thinking. The 307-page report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, released Thursday evening, is a trove for plaintiffs’ lawyers, filled with well-documented allegations of overly risky, undersupervised trading by JPMorgan’s chief investment office; deliberate attempts by the CIO to minimize the appearance of burgeoning losses; and subsequent efforts by the bank to mislead regulators and investors about the CIO’s activities and losses. The report references “previously undisclosed” emails, memos and other documents purportedly showing that “senior managers were told the (CIO portfolio) was massive, losing money, and had stopped providing credit loss protection to the bank, yet downplayed those problems and kept describing the portfolio as a risk-reducing hedge, until forced by billions of dollars in losses to admit disaster.”

That kind of documentary evidence is a rare gift for securities class action lawyers, who usually have to scrape through the preliminaries of fraud litigation without access to any evidence at all from defendants. Here, by contrast, the Senate subcommittee has mapped out precisely what it considers to be misleading statements by top bank officials alongside its evidence that JPMorgan knew the statements were false at the time they were made.

IN NEW CENTURY BK….JUDGE QUICKLY SIGNED ORDER TO DESTROY AND ABANDON LOAN DOCUMENTS

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Underwater PNC Bank Employee Takes Bankster Boss’s Credit Card, Racks Up More than $30,000 in Charges

Underwater PNC Bank Employee Takes Bankster Boss’s Credit Card, Racks Up More than $30,000 in Charges

Carolyn Scarmuzzi hit all the fancy shops at The Gardens Mall in Palm Beach Gardens, among them Nordstrom, Tory Burch and Williams-Sonoma. She dined at the Hogsnapper Shack and Sushi in Tequesta, and maybe even took cooking lessons while she shopped at In The Kitchen on Tequesta Drive.

Not once did Scarmuzzi have to reach into her own pocket to pay, Palm Beach County sheriff’s deputies said. She’d hand over instead the credit card of her boss, who manages the fortunes of clients of PNC Bank’s Palm Beach branch.

The Tequesta woman, 52, is now a former PNC Bank employee — and facing charges of fraud after her arrest Thursday. She was released from the Palm Beach County Jail later that day.

Mark Stephens, Scarmuzzi’s former boss and the managing director of the bank’s private client group, told deputies Scarmuzzi was “under water” and behind on her mortgage, according to a sheriff’s probable-cause affidavit. He said he never gave her permission to use his money.

More here…